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The common goal is quite apparent, the waters may overflow the banks, and, God forbid it, wars may come to hinder and delay; but as surely as the day is day, as right is right, and rivers flow to ocean, the Anglo-Saxon problem will ultimately find solution in the broadest and deepest unity of purpose.

Among the world's great thinkers of other races the peculiar aptitude of the Anglo-Saxon to grasp the thought of his own and others' rights in his quest for liberty has been pointed out. He has been intensely but not selfishly individualistic in his views. To him personal liberty has meant individual liberty, if one may here differentiate in terms. Not merely the liberty to throw off restraint, but liberty to do and be and think and to acquire; liberty to express himself in life and influence, to reach the topmost rung, to climb the highest peak, to fulfill within himself the high possibility of his created being.

One hundred years of peace have not been years of sluggish sleep. Great problems have been met and solved, and these in turn have made new problems, which now meet the English-speaking peoples. During this lapse of time the Anglo-Saxon has contributed largely to modern civilization, and in turn received of its benefactions. He has demanded for himself liberty, and he has attained it and has increased in stature by the attainment. With liberty came enlightenment, and this gave him a vision of opportunity, and he has seized upon it.

The rank and file have answered to the Anglo-Saxon cry to step up higher. Thus far their destiny is accomplished. It has brought an influx of great numbers, the inevitable result of our conception of personal liberty, into the activity incident to national governments, and so influencing the international relations. And now they are turning the wheels of our body politic. National consensus of opinion, always potent, rests not now with the few but with the many.

The spirit of unrest, concerning which so much has been said, comes as a necessary sequence in the development of the liberty of thought among the English peoples, and it has caused some to question whether after all we have not made a bad solution. I have no fears, nor would I retrograde in Anglo-Saxon purpose, but meet the issue squarely.

The problem is profoundly international; it is intensely national; it is pre-eminently individual; involved in it are the principles which sustain world peace.

Referring again to the accepted and well-recognized similarity between British and American conditions and thought, as elements contributing materially to a continuance of English peace, it may well be said that men who think alike have little chance to dispute. So strong is this that were the boundary lines of government suddenly removed with their attendant prejudices, the English-speaking peoples would coalesce, as by the law of attraction, to a common thought and interest.

The point, then, is for us to know that we think alike. This brings international confidence. If we do not know that our neighbor across the line is thinking similar thoughts, having similar hopes, actuated by similar ambitions, we have no common interest in each other. But when we find that he grows roses and we like roses, the door opens and we may go back and forth in new-born comity.

History, travel, commerce, intercommunication, arbitral treaties, and arbitrations lead nations to know

each other better and bring about a common understanding—an international public opinion.

Nations express themselves through their peoples and public opinion, considered in the light of the greater number of those whose thought create it, is more powerful than ever before. It is the power which hereafter can influence war or sustain peace between the English-speaking peoples. It must be addressed; it must be considered; it must be reckoned with.

Mankind yields to two great influences—the intellectual, which affects his judgment, and the moral, affecting his sentiment. The world has ever strongly emphasized the first and too oft minimized the second as being effeminate and intangible.

It has been the intangible, if you please, sympathy, love, honor, patriotic devotion, high unselfishness, which has left its impress in every step of progress in individual or world development. On no other basis can the brotherhood of man be established and maintained; on no other consideration can world peace and home peace be assured. To its gentle attractions the multitudes have ever yielded a ready response; but if it be not offered to the people, what then? There soon is found a lodgment for the world-destroying counterfeit—war-producing hate.

To bring about an international understanding, using the apt term formulated by Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler, so freighted in meaning as to be quickly seized by the English world, we need an "international mind."

We may not stop here, else we fail in our philosophy to realize how much the great world hangs its activities upon the broad sympathies of mankind; the potency of the emotional in man; its quick response to words of love or hate, to kiss or blow; the ready yielding of both men and nations to the common influence of a kindred feeling.

Some years ago an article touching the relations between the United States and Great Britain appeared in the *Atlantic Monthly*. It closed with a sentiment so high and exalted that I bring it here:

"Though our countries may have no formal alliance,  
They have a league of hearts."

The author was your distinguished guest, the sentiment a page from his great heart and life and work.

Let it be paraphrased and then enthroned beside the other one.

Give us then—

An international mind to understand,  
An international heart to feel,

and our hundred years of peace are but the beginning of an endless day of peace on earth, good will to men.

### The School Teacher as the Advance Agent of Peace.

By Thomas H. Lewis, President Western Maryland College and of the Maryland Branch of the American School Peace League.

Address given at the Fourth Annual Meeting of the Maryland Peace Society, McCoy Hall, Baltimore, January 28.

The American School Peace League was organized to extend the peace movement among the school children of our country. The organization is of the simplest character, attempting at present only to bring directly before the pupils the duty and blessings of peace by

celebrating in our schools one day in the year with song, recitation, and addresses on this subject.

The organization is based on the assumption that every great and permanent reform or forward movement must begin with the children. I think this is not only psychologically sound, and abundantly justified in history, but that it is strongly commended to us in that it meets a condition as well as a theory. Children are themselves greatly in need of learning the doctrine and practice of peace for their present experience and not simply for a future manhood.

When one of Job's comforters announced the doctrine that "Man is born unto trouble as the sparks fly upward," he must have had in mind the school-room. All teachers know that man is born to make trouble, and that he begins operations at a very early age. So this phase of the subject need not be dwelt upon. But there is another phase of it no less familiar, but having a bearing upon the subject of peace not sufficiently considered as yet by those who would promote this movement. I mean the tendency in man in his earliest periods of self-activity, so early indeed that he may be said to be born unto it, to get into trouble. The beginning man discovers antagonistic relations very early, even with his nurse, with his long-suffering, peripatetic father, with his brothers and sisters, and throughout boyhood with his school-mates and teachers. His will and theirs do not harmonize; their interests are not identical; their impulses come into collision; no permanent basis of peace seems possible. Difference of viewpoint leads to disputes as to rights, and disputes, unhappily, show a marked tendency to reach quickly an acute stage of ultimatum, after which force and all the horrid din of war. It would thus appear that the state of boyhood is in fact, if not of necessity, a state of war. I shall probably incur the suspicion of a lack of humor by confessing that I view this situation seriously. It has been so long the prerogative of every healthy boy to fight, and the privilege of their elders to enjoy their fights, that any suggestion to the contrary will seem to be an attempt to "impoverish the public stock of harmless pleasures and eclipse the gayety of nations."

However, I cannot persuade myself that this situation is wholly humorous. As a teacher I have had a long education in the significance of apparently insignificant actions and traits in young people, and that if we are to do any effective work in character-building we must be willing to use material which men generally think trivial. There is so much uncertainty as to what is really trivial in a life, growing at every moment and in every direction; such a strong likelihood that any action may be the label of a habit and every trait a premonition in character, where everything is in a flux, that I believe that every successful pedagogue must at least be serious.

And yet there is a sense in which the disputes and fights of boys are laughable; only I would remind you that they are so in the same way precisely that the disputes and fights of men are. It would not be a difficult feat of the imagination to suppose that there are beings, say in Mars, who become as hilarious over what we pompously style our international relations as we do over the comic battles of the playground. In fact we may see this sort of thing actually going on. We of this generation may not be as unlike the generations of old as the inhabitants of Mars are unlike us; but we are

sufficiently unlike them to get a good deal of fun out of their solemn absurdities in the treatment of disputes. It has not been quite three hundred years since Europe abandoned the ordeal. By this method you proved you were not a murderer by touching the corpse without causing it to bleed. You were a witch if you floated after being thrown into the river. You were chaste if you could walk on hot iron without being burned. And you won your suit against the party of the second part if you could hold your arms extended longer than he could.

But we can find abundant provocation to hilarity without going back so far. In fact we may find not a few good jokes of this sort in the solemn records of the nineteenth century.

In the year 1818 a man named Thornton, arraigned in an English court for murder, answered to the indictment by throwing his glove on the floor and saying, "Not guilty, and I will prove it by my body." This looked like a hilarious proceeding, but there was really at that time an unpealed statute making such a plea legitimate; and as no one took up Thornton's glove he went free.

The trivial causes of great disputes make war's solemn pageantry a vast burlesque. In 1853 England, France, and Turkey began the Crimean war with Russia, which lasted three years. It was fought to determine whether the key to the front door of the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem should be kept by the Greek or the Latin monks.

The impotent conclusions of great disputes are notoriously funny. In 1812 America declared war against England for stopping our ships on the seas and impressing seamen. It was discovered later that England had revoked the offensive order five days before we declared war. But the war went on, with inconclusive results, nearly three years, and when the treaty of peace was signed there was not a word in it about the impressment of seamen.

In advancing absurd pretexts for great disputes, it must be admitted that men are greatly superior to children, who in their quarrels never think of pretending. In 1877 Russia began war against Turkey to protect Bulgarian Christians from massacre. In 1897 Russia was the ally of Turkey in the massacre of Armenian Christians. Both of these were "Holy Wars," in which Mohammedan and Christian could claim equal sincerity.

We congratulate ourselves upon a civilization which will henceforth make such wars impossible, and so we preserve our gravity in Congress and the Department of State. We boast of our progress in refusing to permit individuals to go to war and compelling them to settle private disputes in court, where witnesses may be heard, the law examined, and the cause determined by reason and conscience. We are even entering upon an era of sanity in dealing with national disputes, admitting more or less thoroughly the absurdity of denying to nations the procedure we compel individuals to accept, although we still cling to the notion that war is a necessary phase of society, out of which we shall never wholly emerge.

Meanwhile what are we doing to stop this evil in its beginnings? The disputes of men are but the prolongation of the disputes of their childhood, not essentially

different in principle nor in the method of settlement. For in this as in other matters,

"The childhood shows the man  
As morning shows the day."

The American School Peace League is trying, with as yet but scant success, to win one day in the year for the glorification of peace. Children are being tempted by prizes to compose and deliver addresses on peace. Publishers are besought to furnish text-books constructed in the spirit of our own age and not after the spirit of knight-errantry. It is clearly possible, it is eminently philosophic, and it is a reasonable demand of a progressive age that human history shall be presented to children in its entirety, not as a panegyric of physical force, but to show the whole broad scope of those movements which have brought us where we are.

These things we are talking about and to some extent trying to do. They should not be depreciated. Yet it must be confessed that holding peace meetings among children may be as barren of results in bringing on the actual reign of peace as they often are among adults. The teacher who would make a positive contribution to this movement must recognize that the real root of the evil we are trying to extirpate lies in the personal conduct and character, and that the true evangel of peace will be the presentation of those ideals, and that message which will bring about in our own experience the suppression of passion and the development of reason in settling our disputes, great and small. Here I think the teacher finds his supreme opportunity. The chief end of education is the development of reason, and where this fails education is but a name. Passion is what we yield to and needs no education; reason is that by which we obtain the mastery, and can only come by the slow processes of training. Now, education is itself essentially a conflict and, because of its usual associations, largely a conflict between individuals, involving emulations, rivalries, strifes. When these are conducted under the inspiration of passion, as they are now to a great extent, they result in some of the worst developments of character, cheating, lying, and all uncharitableness. But under the guidance of reason such conflicts are not only harmless in themselves, but they develop some of the best traits of character, self-reliance, perseverance, joy of victory.

To enthrone the ideals of peace in the school-room is not, therefore, to make school life as insipid as the relation of one boy with a tutor, nor to inaugurate a reign of intellectual death. It is life, rather; the highest life, the true life of reason which is thus given a free field and opportunity to begin the development which makes life's long warfare. But as long as we stupidly maintain that a grown man makes his noblest contribution to his country by going to war, we need not expect to convince our children that fighting is not a better way to carry on the strifes of education than to yield to the sweet reasonableness of a generous peace.

But this supreme opportunity involves also the teacher's greatest difficulty. It is not difficult to persuade children to accept ideals. For whether Napoleon was right or not in saying that "Imagination rules the world," it is certain that imagination rules childhood. Children are quickly fired with the heroic, the chivalrous, the unselfish. And if the whole task of the teacher were simply to kindle the imagination with those ideals

to which peace gives the noblest setting the victory over war would not be long delayed. Unfortunately, human nature in children is constantly making its protest against these ideals, and this protest is constantly being supported by the examples of men whom children naturally accept as models. Fathers who have cleared up the distinction for themselves between private and national disputes, so as to justify them in demanding the procedure of reason in one while permitting the arbitration of war in the other, have not made this distinction clear to their children. Perhaps we ought not to expect them to attempt this feat of logic. Fathers who would feel disgraced by a fist fight over a private dispute will brag about just such a settlement of the disputes of their boys. Meanwhile the children accept this confusion as natural and go on following the practice of their fathers which agrees with human nature and rejecting their ideals which opposes human nature. They settle the greatest disputes they have in the same way their fathers settle the greatest of their disputes.

The teacher is thus sadly hampered and doubtless often discouraged. Nevertheless, the genuine idealist—and no other is fit to be a teacher—will not despair. He will continue to preach "peace to him that is far off and to him that is near." He will continue to hold up to children as a manly ideal the practice of men in private disputes which now prevails among all civilized people. He will trace with patient confidence the gradual development of this practice through many centuries and much obloquy from the most absurd suggestions of ignorant superstition. And with true prophetic fire he will continue to point to the indications multiplying on every hand, the sure harbingers of a development still going on, the steady progress of human opinion and practice from less to more, from individual to national, toward the larger ideal of a world-wide supremacy of reason, which must ultimately prevail.

## The Immediate Establishment of an International Court of Arbitral Justice.

By Thomas Raeburn White, of the Philadelphia Bar.

[A paper read at the Conference of the American Society for Judicial Settlement of International Disputes, Washington, D. C., December 21, 1912.]

The project to establish an international court of arbitral justice, recommended by the Second Hague Conference, has received the approval of jurists on both sides of the water. Some of the considerations which commend it are the desirability of building up an international common law through the decisions of a permanent judicial body; the importance of offering a means of securing a judicial decision, rather than a compromise of an international dispute, if such be the preference of the contending powers, and the necessity of a permanent tribunal which can be called upon to decide whether disputes are within the terms of obligatory treaties of arbitration, before such treaties can become of real binding force.

There is another consideration which does not seem to me to have received the attention it deserves—the very great increase of arbitral settlements which would almost certainly and immediately follow the establishment of the court. Without in the least meaning to